La scelta di Meseberg. Brevi note sulla rinuncia ad assorbire il MES nel quadro giuridico-istituzionale dell’Unione alla prova dell’emergenza pandemica

In December 2017, the Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation on the establishment of the European Monetary Fund, which would have accomplished the “repatriation” of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) set out in a Treaty between the Eurozone Member States in 2012. The “Meseberg choice” is the decision to turn down such “repatriation” and to make amendments to the EMS Treaty instead. The essay first looks at the impact of the new course of action on the decision-making procedure designed to accomplish changes to the mechanism of financial assistance. It then focuses on the changed role of the European Parliament laid down in the proposed regulation, which would be entirely cancelled in the amended Treaty. It goes on by making a few remarks on the changes in the role of the Court of Justice that would have occurred following the repatriation. The actual added value of the “Community method”, with regard to the mechanism of financial assistance and the overall economic and monetary union, is also covered. The huge economic crisis followed by the Covid-19 outbreak called on the availability of the ESM financial assistance on special conditions: the impact of the Meseberg choice in taking this decision is eventually considered.