In this paper,wepresent a generalization of power indices which includesthe preferences of the voters. Using a Multilinear Extension perspective (Owen inManage Sci 18:p64–p72, 1972a) we measure the probability of the players’ voting“yes” for a particular political issue. Further, we randomize the issues and showthe influence that the Agenda Setter can have on a player’s power. We demonstratethese results using data from the European Union to show how the powerdistribution may shift after enlargement and under the new Constitutional Treaty.[...]

Preferences, the Agenda Setter and the Distribution of Power in the EU

PASSARELLI, Francesco;
2007

Abstract

In this paper,wepresent a generalization of power indices which includesthe preferences of the voters. Using a Multilinear Extension perspective (Owen inManage Sci 18:p64–p72, 1972a) we measure the probability of the players’ voting“yes” for a particular political issue. Further, we randomize the issues and showthe influence that the Agenda Setter can have on a player’s power. We demonstratethese results using data from the European Union to show how the powerdistribution may shift after enlargement and under the new Constitutional Treaty.[...]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11575/10424
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