The International Convention against Doping in Sport is an authentic turning point for those who’s studying Sports Law from a General Theory of Law’s point of view.In fact, before its coming into force, all sporting legal system’s rules, that regulate doping, may be inscribed within those soft law instruments, that today’s globalized society uses as an effective alternative to States’ regulations. After its coming into force, these soft-law rules change nature and become a hard-law command, making them binding rules, authentic jus cogens with legal effects erga omnes: a distinctive feature that until now doesn’t belong to them. Now, all regulations about doping, established within lex sportiva and settled into WADA Code, are introduced in States’ legal systems by traditional legal instruments: soft-law becomes hard-law. This is a problematic change considering, first, the different Grundnorm, upon which are based sports legal system and States’ law, and, then, the intrinsic conventional nature of Sport’s law, certainly not shared by States’ legal systems. This essential difference among Sports law and States’ law points out further questions, especially when Convention comes into force in those nations where doping is a crime, as occurring in France or in Italy.Focusing on Italian legal system, it’s important to underline that the law, by which the Convention comes into force, was adopted without coordination with pre-existing rules about doping: this points out some interesting questions. I’ll consider especially questions deriving from the equivalence, established by art. 2.3 b) of Convention, among use or attempted use of prohibited substance or prohibited method: may we considering this rule contrasting with the general rule of Italian penal code (art. 56 c. p.), which states a decrease of punishment when it’s carried out an attempted crime?I’ll also focus on questions deriving from the equivalence, established by art. 2.3 f) of Convention, between possession of prohibited substances or methods and use or presence of a prohibited substance or its metabolites or markers in an athlete’s bodily specimen: what interest is injured, if occurred possession without doping committing? And when occurs this injury?
The International Convention against Doping in Sport and its coming into force in Italian national legislation
DI GIANDOMENICO, Anna
2010-01-01
Abstract
The International Convention against Doping in Sport is an authentic turning point for those who’s studying Sports Law from a General Theory of Law’s point of view.In fact, before its coming into force, all sporting legal system’s rules, that regulate doping, may be inscribed within those soft law instruments, that today’s globalized society uses as an effective alternative to States’ regulations. After its coming into force, these soft-law rules change nature and become a hard-law command, making them binding rules, authentic jus cogens with legal effects erga omnes: a distinctive feature that until now doesn’t belong to them. Now, all regulations about doping, established within lex sportiva and settled into WADA Code, are introduced in States’ legal systems by traditional legal instruments: soft-law becomes hard-law. This is a problematic change considering, first, the different Grundnorm, upon which are based sports legal system and States’ law, and, then, the intrinsic conventional nature of Sport’s law, certainly not shared by States’ legal systems. This essential difference among Sports law and States’ law points out further questions, especially when Convention comes into force in those nations where doping is a crime, as occurring in France or in Italy.Focusing on Italian legal system, it’s important to underline that the law, by which the Convention comes into force, was adopted without coordination with pre-existing rules about doping: this points out some interesting questions. I’ll consider especially questions deriving from the equivalence, established by art. 2.3 b) of Convention, among use or attempted use of prohibited substance or prohibited method: may we considering this rule contrasting with the general rule of Italian penal code (art. 56 c. p.), which states a decrease of punishment when it’s carried out an attempted crime?I’ll also focus on questions deriving from the equivalence, established by art. 2.3 f) of Convention, between possession of prohibited substances or methods and use or presence of a prohibited substance or its metabolites or markers in an athlete’s bodily specimen: what interest is injured, if occurred possession without doping committing? And when occurs this injury?I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
