This paper studies the problem of the efficiency of collective choice within the European Union. With the recent enlargement there is a larger risk that the choices of the majority can hit individual members. It is also more likely that common choices prove to be inefficient, if not irrational. The first risk is that of the "tyranny of the majority", the second is the difficulty of generating with majority voting a preference aggregation that has desirable characteristics and, above all, respects the basic principles of democracy.[...]
Meccanismi di voto ed efficienza decisionale nell’Ue
PASSARELLI, Francesco
2006-01-01
Abstract
This paper studies the problem of the efficiency of collective choice within the European Union. With the recent enlargement there is a larger risk that the choices of the majority can hit individual members. It is also more likely that common choices prove to be inefficient, if not irrational. The first risk is that of the "tyranny of the majority", the second is the difficulty of generating with majority voting a preference aggregation that has desirable characteristics and, above all, respects the basic principles of democracy.[...]File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
